Abstract-Transaction costs are a critical factor to the success of secondary spectrum markets. This paper proposes a novel approach to study the effects of transaction costs on secondary use of radio spectrum. We develop an agent-based spectrum access model to examine the pre-conditions as to when and why the secondary use would emerge and in what form. The agentbased model allows us to study both economic and technical aspects of the spectrum sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Measurement studies have indicated that spectrum is used sporadically in many geographical areas and times [1] . In an effort to promote efficiency of spectrum usage, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has supported the idea of using market mechanism to provide secondary access especially in the unused part of spectrum [2] . The development of secondary spectrum markets includes the markets for license trading and for temporary access of existing licensed spectrum. In this paper, we focus on the secondary use of spectrum defined as a temporary use by a user of licensed spectrum owned by an incumbent who is distinct from the user.
As discussed earlier in [3] , [4] , secondary use of spectrum raises numerous technical, institutional, and economic problems that merit investigation. Central to the issues are the effects of transaction costs and potential interference. Transaction costs associated with leasing or other market factors must be reasonable for spectrum sharing to become practical. We expect that the transaction costs depend on technical factors (such as the types of wireless services, application requirements, and capabilities of software-defined radio) and economic factors (such as number of participants in the market and price setting). In addition, different forms of sharing could play an important role on transaction costs as well as the level of uncertainties due to potential interference. For example, a spot market, in which a secondary user obtains spectrum access on demand might be appropriate only in certain circumstances. In other cases, it might be preferable to use more complex contracting arrangements such as a longterm leasing or an indirect spectrum access such as Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), in which the operations of primary and secondary users are tightly coupled.
The goal of the study is to identify the pre-conditions to secondary use and the form in which it would take place.
Since the focus is on the transaction costs of spectrum sharing, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) plays a central role in this study. TCE provides a framework to examine the relationship between transaction characteristics and suitable organization forms to carry out the transactions. Thus, we apply TCE to the problem of secondary spectrum access.
We use Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) as a tool to model the development of transactions in the spectrum market. ACE is the computational study of economies modeled as dynamic systems of autonomous interacting agents [5] . Unlike the top-down deductive approach of conventional economic analysis that tends to oversimplify and represent stylized settings of markets, ACE approach works from bottom up by creating adaptive, heterogeneous agents who interact with one another in dynamic environments. The primary goal of ACE, however, is not to derive closed-form solutions, but to observe and study the aggregate outcomes and the norms of behavior that are developed and sustained over time. The understanding of the process, in our case the conditions that lead to secondary use of spectrum, can then be used to create interventions (i.e., policy instruments) in order to obtain the favorable outcomes of spectrum management.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review Transaction Cost Economics, which is the theoretical framework of our agent-based model. In Section III, we propose the agent-based spectrum access model and discuss the model implementation with descriptions of agents, environments, learning algorithm and their associated parameters. Section IV presents preliminary simulation results and discussion. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and highlights the future development of the model.
II. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE)
A transaction, whether to obtain products or services, can take place within several forms of economic organization. TCE views a firm as a production function to be optimized; the firm itself may be used to organize such transactions. In the production process, TCE is usually known as the study of "make-or-buy" decision. Two polar forms in TCE framework are markets and firms. In addition to that, several intermediate forms such as different types of contractual arrangements, alliances, and joint ventures can be categorized as hybrid forms. The preferred choice of organizational forms obviously depends on the comparison of the transaction costs under each alternative. The theory provides a framework to assess the strengths and weaknesses of alternative forms of organization under different circumstances through the study of transaction properties and behaviors of economic agents.
When comparing the uses of markets and firms to organize a transaction, markets are characterized by the price mechanism based on demand and supply to achieve efficient resource allocation. Market price serves as a signal to inform market participants of potential exchanges that would leave them better off. The price signal provides powerful incentives for participants to recognize profit opportunities and allows them to adapt to changes in demand and supply as the price reflects the value of the trading commodity. The use of the price mechanism, however, requires trading partners to search and find each other, and to negotiate a transaction. These activities incur ex ante transaction costs of search and information costs and negotiation costs. Once the transaction is underway they have to ensure compliance with the specified terms and respond when the agreement is violated. The resulting ex post transaction costs are in forms of monitoring and enforcement costs such as costs of inspection and auditing, costs of arbitration, and court fees.
According to Coase [6] , the existence of these transaction costs through the use of price mechanism creates much burden of the resources and the firm exists because the costs of some specific transactions are lower when carry out inside the firm. Compared to a market, organizing the transaction under unified ownership offers greater administrative control, facilitates coordination, and creates higher protection for specific investments. Especially in the situations where adaptation to changes by coordination is significant, firms are more likely to outperform markets [7] . Although these benefits can reduce the transaction costs occurred in the market, they are countered by the added bureaucratic costs and weaker economic incentives. The shift from the market to the hybrid form, and to the firm creates tradeoffs between stronger economic incentives and adaptive properties of the market, and stronger protections and coordination properties of the firm. The empirical studies show that a number of economic activities across various industries are generally aligned with this central theoretical framework of TCE [8] , [9] .
As developed by Williamson [10] , [11] , [12] , TCE explains the decisions made by the trading partners on the choices of organizational structures using human behaviors and transaction characteristics. Two major behavioral assumptions underlying the existence of transaction costs are bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to the limited capability of agents to be rational even they are intended to be. Because of this limitation, agents cannot create contracts that can protect them against all possible events that might occur in a trade. Thus, TCE maintains that complex contracts are typically incomplete. This incompleteness can expose economic agents to transaction hazards from potential opportunism. This second assumption refers to the fact that economic agents are driven by their self-interest seeking behaviors and they have a potential to behave opportunistically in order to gain advantages for themselves. Opportunistic behavior explicitly refers to acting in bad faith such as providing misleading information and creating confusion with the goal of achieving an advantage in a trade. The possibility of opportunism will raise the transaction costs as agents try to safeguard their investment from transaction hazards. Depending on the characteristics of the transaction, such an opportunistic behavior, however, can be discouraged by transacting under the proper form of organization.
The magnitude of transaction costs is influenced by three characteristics of the transaction: 1) Asset specificity is considered a key factor in TCE. Specific assets are valuable in the context of a specific transaction and have much lower value in the best alternative uses. They are likely to produce sunk costs when the relation terminates prematurely. Transactions that involve specific assets force economic agents to put higher safeguard into their investment. This type of transactions is particularly vulnerable to opportunism. 2) Uncertainty refers to the possibility that unforeseen circumstances arise during the relation and agents need to adapt to. Transactions under relatively high uncertainty environment require agents to be aware of the potential complication and subsequent costs of adaptation. Uncertainty also introduces the risk of opportunism during the adaptation process. 3) The frequency in which the transaction occurs can influence the optimal organization choice. Transaction that occurs rarely may not worth investing in an expensive form of organization. The combination of these three attributes serve to justify the appropriate form of organization in terms of transaction cost economics reasoning.
III. AGENT-BASED MODEL FOR SPECTRUM ACCESS

A. Overview
We propose a study of a discrete-time agent-based economic model for spectrum access. The model consists of two types of economic agents: spectrum access consumers and spectrum access providers. Both the agents and their operating environments can be customized to reflect different scenarios. For example, the spectrum needs of consumers can be set up to represent short-range or long-range communications according to transmit powers, receiver capabilities, and other requirements, or to reflect some well-defined wireless standards. Several configurations of the spectrum use of providers, such as broadcast networks or cellular networks, are possible by defining, among others, the range of frequencies they use, transmitter and receiver locations, transmit power, and receiver requirements. The operating environment can be modified to represent urban or rural settings. Our goal is to explore the emerging behavior when the secondary use of spectrum is introduced as an additional method to obtain spectrum access.
More specifically, we focus on the questions of when and why consumers would choose secondary use of spectrum and in what form. This study involves identifying processes or scenarios that leads to outcomes through the repeated interactions of these autonomous agents.
B. Incorporating TCE Assumptions
As mentioned in earlier, transaction costs occur because of bounded rationality and the potential for opportunistic behavior. In order to gain insight into the effects of transaction costs, the model incorporates both behavioral assumptions into its agents. In the case of bounded rationality, consumer and provider agents are subject to several kinds of limitations. In particular, agents do not have complete information about the environment in which they operate. Each provider does not have access to consumer preferences and their potential opportunistic behaviors. Similarly, each consumer does not have information about behaviors of providers or other consumers. An agent must observe the outcomes of the transactions, learn from the interactions, and adapt its action in the simulated environment. Agents also have limited processing capacity which is implemented by using learning algorithm with minimal complexity.
For opportunistic behavior, we focus on the impact of interference (i.e., wireless signal interference) on both consumers and providers. One way to model this is to set up a probability that provider agents would overstate supply quantities; i.e., lease spectrum that could create interference to consumers in order to generate more revenue. Likewise, consumers also have potential to understate their demand quantities; i.e., specify less spectrum than what they actually need in order to reduce cost. It should be noted that overstating the supply may not always be the best strategy for providers. Depending on price elasticity of consumers and characteristics of the market, providers may instead understate their supply quantities in order to generate a higher market price. Understating the supply quantities, however, will not create interference to consumers.
C. Consumer Agents
Consumers are characterized by their spectrum needs, which in turn are influenced by their application requirements and network configurations. The three main parameters used in the model are frequency bandwidth, duration of access, and utility function. The frequency bandwidth is expressed in Basic Bandwidth Unit (BBU), the pre-defined amount of bandwidth in kHz. The duration of access is expressed in the number of model time steps. Each consumer also maintains his/her utility function as a perceived value of the received quality of transmission.
We use degree of control as a common indicator to differentiate multiple forms of economic organization that can be used for organizing spectrum access transactions. Degree of control refers to the ability of the organizational form to contain opportunistic behaviors and to facilitate the compatibility of actions among transacting agents. As suggested by TCE [7] , Considering opportunistic behaviors and coordination capabilities in terms of their interference effects, using degree of control as an indicator allows us to incorporate traditional methods of spectrum access, namely unlicensed spectrum and exclusive license into the picture. Unlicensed spectrum does not provide interference protection, nor does it facilitate the coordination among unlicensed users. Therefore, it has lower degree of control compared to markets. On the other hand, a spectrum license gives a licensee an exclusive access and a full interference protection. Thus, a license yields higher degree of control than integrations.
Given an array of choices to obtain spectrum access as shown in Fig. 1 , each consumer chooses among several combinations of {organizational form, duration} to satisfy his/her spectrum demand. As a result of the transaction, each consumer calculates a surplus value, s, s/he received (see Table I for notations and other parameters of consumer agents).
An objective of the consumer is commonly assumed to maximize his/her surplus [13] , [14] . Accordingly, consumers use a learning algorithm (described later) to adapt their preferences based on the received surplus from each transaction.
D. Provider Agents
Providers in the spectrum access model are those who currently own exclusive spectrum licenses. They sublease unused parts of their spectrum in terms of the number of BBUs and lease durations requested by the consumer agents. Given the degree of control chosen by the consumer, each provider agent has a choice of a feasible price per BBU that can be expressed as a markup choice (see Table II for parameters of provider agents):
Since the objective of each provider is to maximize his/her profit from sharing spectrum, the received profit from each transaction is used to modify the markup preference 1 . 
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E. Learning Algorithm
Given the result of the transaction, each agent adapts its action in order to maximize its own objective. One of the popular learning algorithms used to capture the natural learning process of human and organization is reinforcement learning [15] , [16] . The underlying concept is that the propensity to take any particular action should be increased or reinforced if it produces favorable outcomes and decreased if it leads to negative results (see [17] ).
In particular, we implement the reinforcement comparison method which establishes a reference level of result (reward) and uses this reference value to evaluate the outcome of the future transactions. Thus, the consumer's learning process is as follows: 
This learning process is also applied to provider agents in a similar fashion.
for m chosen at time t π
, ∀ m ∈ M Table III presents a set of parameters that describe the environment where the agents live. They can be modified to create different operating scenarios in addition to the parameters of consumers and providers.
F. Environment setups and examples of the learning process
To demonstrate the process of the spectrum access model, Fig. 2 shows the learning process of a consumer agent. In this example, there is only one consumer operating in the environment. Obviously, the best strategy for this consumer is to use unlicensed spectrum because there is no cost to acquire exclusive rights and there is no possibility of interference. The graph shows that the consumer tries out different combinations of degrees of control and lease durations (the duration s/he stays on that degree of control), and finally converges to 0.0 (unlicensed spectrum) as a choice for spectrum access. Fig. 3 shows an average consumer surplus of ten consumer agents operating in the same environment. The reinforcement learning allows each consumer to adapt his/her action to maximize his/her objective (i.e., surplus). Hence, we observe an average surplus increases over time.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we describe a set of preliminary experiments to demonstrate some of the important features of our agentbased model. These are not intended to be final results as this research project is still in process. The objective is to produce some baseline results and to provide some degree of model validation. We study the behavior of consumer agents in terms of their selections of degree of control (d c ) in response to the existence of secondary use, number of consumers and providers in the environment, and spectrum access characteristics of consumer agents.
First, we present the case where the secondary use of spectrum is not allowed (the current policy scenario). Each consumer agent has to either use unlicensed spectrum or acquire an exclusive license in order to obtain spectrum access. In all experiments, consumer agents are randomly positioned in the simulation area and their locations are changed in each run. For each consumer, the location of the receiver is within the maximum coverage from its transmitter. The transmit power is calculated to provide reliable communications (satisfy receiver's SNR requirement) for any receiver inside the transmitter's maximum coverage.
When using unlicensed spectrum, consumer agent randomly selects an operating frequency channel in every time step. This implementation is similar to the frequency hopping technique used in the unlicensed band. The cost of using unlicensed is zero. If a consumer agent selects secondary use, s/he will submit a spectrum access request to every provider agents. The provider with the lowest price will get transacted. At the moment, we assume that consumer pays an additional fixed cost that is linearly increased with d c for every secondary use transaction. When using an exclusive license, consumer pays the license cost. The agent is locked in and cannot select other choices of spectrum access until the license expired. In addition, we assume that if the consumer agent chooses an exclusive license or a spectrum lease from a provider, s/he can expect an interference-free operation over the entire simulation area. Table IV presents as averages over every consumer agent over multiple runs. For each run, the resulting d c value for each consumer agent is determined when the probability that the agent chooses that value ≥ 0.9.
A. Without Secondary Use
In this scenario, spectrum access choices are limited to unlicensed spectrum and exclusive licenses. Thus, the degree of control value for each consumer is either 0.0 or 1.0. We assume that the number of spectrum licenses is greater than the number of consumers. In other words, an exclusive license is available for each and every consumer agent. From  Fig. 4 , an increase in number of consumers operating in the same area yields a higher use of exclusive licenses as expected. With the maximum coverage up to 300 meters, unlicensed spectrum can provide access for all values of N C . At 400 meters with N C = 150 and 200, the unlicensed band is getting crowded and the negative outcomes of interferences in the unlicensed band starting to outweigh the cost of an exclusive license. As a result, some consumer agents switch to exclusive licenses. The graph also shows an increasing use of exclusive licenses as the maximum coverage of each consumer increases. Higher value of maximum coverage requires transmitters to raise the transmit power, thus producing higher interference to other unlicensed spectrum users.
By holding all parameters the same and increasing the bandwidth requirement of each consumer to 10 BBUs (M 2 = 10), Fig. 5 shows a movement towards exclusive licenses as early as the maximum coverage of 100 meters. This is due to the larger amount of bandwidth is needed, but the amount available in the unlicensed band remains the same. Thus, the unlicensed band is filled up faster. Moreover, the higher bandwidth requirement justifies the cost of an exclusive license than the lower bandwidth case (Fig. 4) . It should be observed that although the unlicensed band can fit in at lease 5 consumers (U = 50 and M 2 = 10), the graph shows consumer agents choosing exclusive licenses in both N C = 2 and N C = 5 cases. The explanation is that the unlicensed spectrum does not provide any coordination among unlicensed users. As a result, the operating frequencies of unlicensed users may be overlapped and creating interferences that, oftentimes, too severe that some agents opt for exclusive licenses. Fig. 6 and 7 show the effects of changing QoS sensitivity of consumers (α u ). Fig. 6 shows a higher use of exclusive licenses as α u increases. Consumer agents with strict QoS requirements select exclusive licenses as expected. In the case of M 2 = 10 ( Fig. 7) , most of the agents have already chosen exclusive licenses (see Fig. 5 ), hence the outcomes of changing α u are not much different.
B. With Secondary Use
The following set of experiments is similar to the previous one, except that we introduce secondary use into the model. With secondary use, the role of providers (spectrum incumbents) comes into play. Each provider holds an exclusive license and shares an unused amount of spectrum (defined by B) to consumers for a period of time (defined by L). The lease period l ∈ L is a value normalized to an exclusive license duration (T license ). We study the behavior of consumer agents in response to different numbers of providers. Consider the case of M 1 = 1 and N C = 10 without secondary use, Fig. 4 shows that all consumer agents choose unlicensed band at any coverage. With secondary use, Fig. 8 shows that a small percentage of consumer agents choose secondary use and transact with providers. The amount of secondary use also increases with the maximum coverage. As the coverage increases, consumer agents are more likely to receive interferences from other agents using the unlicensed band. Hence, some of them switch to secondary use as an alternative to the crowded unlicensed and the expensive exclusive license. We cannot, however, make any conclusion about the effects of number of providers from the graph. We suspect that since an exclusive license is not a desirable option when M 1 = 1 and N C = 10 (see Fig. 4 ), agents are selecting secondary use as an alternative to unlicensed spectrum even when N P is low. Additional experiments are clearly needed. and 15, all of them choose either unlicensed or secondary use, hence the drop in average d c . Fig. 10 shows the corresponding lease duration of the scenario in Fig. 9 . The lease duration increases with the maximum coverage and is independent of N P . As mentioned earlier, the increase in maximum coverage forces consumer agents to find an alternative to unlicensed spectrum. Since we simulate the scenario where consumers need spectrum access every time step (i.e., transmissions take place all the time), securing spectrum access through a long-term lease may be an appropriate choice. As a future work, incorporating traffic model to reflect consumer's application needs and characteristics of spectrum shared by providers is expected to produce a different set of outcomes.
These preliminary results show that the introduction of secondary use allows a portion of consumers who cannot afford exclusive licenses to become secondary users. For those who can afford exclusive licenses, secondary use is a viable choice when the number of spectrum incumbents participating in secondary use is sufficient.
C. Opportunism
To demonstrate another important feature of the agent-based model, we consider a scenario that contains one provider with opportunistic behavior. Recall that the provider with oppor- tunistic behavior will try to generate additional revenue by sharing spectrum that could create interferences to consumers (e.g., leasing the same part of spectrum to more than one consumer at a time). We assume that consumer agent can distinguish his/her transacting partners and can develop and maintain basic trust information on each of his/her partners. Following Klos's agent-based modeling of trust [18] , trust is defined as the ability to act according to expectation. In our case, this refers to secondary use without interference. We further assume that trust increases with the number of consecutive transactions without interference. The development of trust is specified by the following equation [18] :
where b is the base-level of trust and x is the number of consecutive transactions without interference. f is a parameter that controls trust development rate. From the equation, the range of trust value is [0, 1]. In our case, we use b = 0.5 and f = 0.5. Fig. 11 illustrates the improvement of trust with the number of transactions without interference. In this experiment, we apply the following rule. When consumer i experiences interferences while using spectrum of provider j, consumer i's trust in provider j is reduced by half. If trust drops below 0.3, consumer i will transact with provider j with probability of 0.5. If consumer i does not experience interferences while transacting with provider j, the trust starts to increase from the current trust level at the rate shown in Fig. 11 .
The simulation consists of 5 consumers with M 2 = 10, Max. coverage = 200 meters and α u = 100. We observe the provider with opportunistic behavior. Fig. 12 presents the probability that this provider will share spectrum that could create interferences to his/her transacting partners. The graph shows that the probability drops as N P increases (note that for N P = 1, 2, and 3, none of the consumers chooses secondary use).
The result is the market reaction to opportunism. As the number of providers increases, the amount of sharable spectrum becomes larger. Consumer agents have more choices in terms of selecting their transacting partners. They can switch to other providers with acceptable level of trust. The provider with opportunistic behavior starts to experience a drop in revenue, because s/he receives fewer transactions. Consequently, this provider adapts to the situation by reducing his/her opportunistic behavior in order to create trust and acquire more transactions.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We propose an agent-based model for spectrum access to study the effects of transaction costs with the goal of identifying the pre-conditions to the secondary use of spectrum. Although the model is in its infancy, we believe that the strength of the model is in its ability to simulate different scenarios of spectrum usage from both supply side and demand side. By incorporating technical parameters of wireless communications into economic agents, the model allows us to study both economic and technical aspects of spectrum sharing. With certain assumptions, it would be useful to quantify technical parameters and establish a set of conditions for the feasible spectrum sharing. As with other research that recognize the benefit of ACE, the understanding of aggregate behaviors of the agents can be used to guide policy development for efficient spectrum markets.
With the research in Software-Defined Radio (SDR) moving toward commercial implementation, we envision the incorporation of SDR into the spectrum access model. In our context, SDR will provide higher flexibility in spectrum access for both consumers and providers. Consumers equipped with SDR-based reconfigurable devices can adapt their operating parameters such as frequency range (multiband), air interface (multimode), modulation type, output power, etc. by making a change in software [19] . Thus, exposing them to a larger pool of available spectrum. Providers with SDR technology can adapt their spectrum usage to accommodate consumer's demand or to create a larger portion of idle spectrum available for lease.
In an extreme case, cognitive radio, which is built upon SDR, can sense its surrounding environment and perform realtime changes in its operating parameters to provide reliable and efficient use of spectrum [20] , [21] . Conceptually, this intelligent cognitive radio has the abilities to detect idle part of spectrum, modify its parameters, then transmit and vacate the channel if necessary. These capabilities could lead to other forms of spectrum sharing that entail coexistence or cooperative mechanisms such as unlicensed opportunistic access, secondary market for opportunistic access, or interruptible secondary access [22] .
From the TCE framework, when agents are highly flexible with their spectrum access, their perceived asset specificity and uncertainty of transactions will reduce. Therefore, we expect that the flexibility provided by SDR will create a shift towards the market side to organize spectrum access transactions. The implementation of SDR obviously comes with an extra cost. Should consumers and providers invest in SDR and take advantages of market mechanisms or should they invest in a long-term relationship (towards integration or firm) to guarantee reliable spectrum access? What types of flexibility are important? These tradeoffs are subjects of an ongoing investigation.
